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 Law anticipated genetic discrimination in insurance. Legislators 
in the 1990s accepted genetic equity as a valuable, if abstract, con-
cept largely removed from the realities of insurance underwriting or 
coverage decisions. Things may become complex quickly, however, 
when genetic discrimination laws face reality. Difficulties suggest 
themselves when one attempts to define “discrimination” in practice 
and then to match statutory language to the practical problem of lim-
iting its effect. Enforcing genetic prohibitions raises perplexing regu-
latory problems, as forms of health finance morph more rapidly than 
regulators can anticipate. 
 The enterprise is vital notwithstanding the difficulties. Denial of 
coverage or care on the basis of genetics violates the principles of so-
cial solidarity that are, or should be, at the core of health insurance 
law. State and federal lawmakers enacted laws limiting or forbidding 
genetic discrimination in health coverage during the 1990s, a period 
of both broad economic growth and very stable health care costs. 
More recently, the economy has faltered and health care cost infla-
tion has revived with a vengeance. Renewed health care cost infla-
tion appears to be consistent with the nearly Malthusian tendency 
with which technological advances in health care and the increasing 
demands of an aging population drive the expense of health services 
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ever higher.1 A tight economy and increasing costs will create the 
perception of scarcity and further the pressure to ration care. In such 
times, the movement to genetic equity in insurance takes on a new 
character. In good times, the movement seemed a piece of incre-
mental reform, marginally expanding insurance access. Under cost-
containment scrutiny, however, it takes on a different cast. In these 
more restrained times, advocates of genetic equity in health insur-
ance must firmly establish their position in anticipation of renewed 
attention to rationing.  
 This Article posits that overt rationing is inevitable. It argues that 
the genetic antidiscrimination movement, along with others pursuing 
health coverage equity, must consolidate its position in anticipation 
of retrenchment. Genetic equity should be regarded not as an excep-
tional goal, but as an aim consistent with a broader movement to-
ward equitable access to health care in a time of scarcity. 
 Part I of this Article describes genetic discrimination as it per-
tains to health coverage. Part II examines the statutory response to 
genetic discrimination. It first considers but then rejects the possibil-
ity that genetic discrimination in health coverage can be remedied by 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).2 It then examines spe-
cific genetic discrimination laws adopted in many states in recent 
years. Part III examines the difficulties that will arise in enforcing 
statutory prohibitions. It concludes that some of the enforcement dif-
ficulties may be avoided by clearer statutory drafting, while others 
are inherent in the modern forms of health finance. Part IV looks to 
the future—it recognizes that genetic discrimination laws cobbled 
onto existing insurance institutions may cause instability in insur-
ance markets and that serving the goals of equitable access to health 
coverage requires broader systems change. It forecasts increasing 
cost pressures on health care delivery, and suggests that such pres-
sures will lead inevitably to some form of rationing. It concludes that 
well-established antidiscrimination principles are essential for the 
integrity of any rationing response to scarcity. 
 It may be important at the outset to be clear on why an examina-
tion of genetic discrimination in health insurance is and is not impor-
tant. There is very little evidence that insurers have used genetic 
makeup in any substantial way to assist in either underwriting or 
coverage decisions. Insurers may do so; however, should they be 
permitted? Are scientific advances likely to render prognostic testing 
feasible and economic? Such practices would be the appropriate sub-
                                                                                                                    
 1. See Drew E. Altman & Larry Levitt, The Sad History of Health Care Cost Con-
tainment As Told In One Chart, HEALTH AFF., Jan. 2002, at http://www.healthaffairs.org/ 
WebExclusives/2101Altman.pdf (last visited January 29, 2003) (on file with author). 
 2. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000)). 
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ject of prohibitory legislation. More significantly, however, the wide 
adoption of genetic discrimination statutes in advance of need sug-
gests a broad social rejection of the propriety of considering such in-
formation. The justification for genetic discrimination legislation 
and, generally, the relationship between these statutes and insur-
ance are of great interest to those concerned with financing care for 
historically expensive populations, such as the chronically ill. These 
statutes suggest that support for the putative American tradition of 
matching the price of health insurance to anticipated risk by market 
methods is fading. The resurgence of health cost inflation, however, 
suggests that emerging principles of health insurance access equity 
will run squarely into a cost-conscious attempt to restrict funding for 
care. 
I.   THE PROBLEM OF GENETIC DISCRIMINATION IN HEALTH COVERAGE 
 “Genetic discrimination”3 is a topic that has attracted substantial 
scholarly interest in general4 and in the insurance context in particu-
lar.5 The use of genetic information for insurance purposes is contro-
versial, notwithstanding several circumstances suggesting that ge-
netic information is of little practical importance to insurers and un-
                                                                                                                    
 3. An early definition of “genetic discrimination” was “the denial of rights, privileges 
or opportunities on the basis of information obtained from genetically-based diagnostic and 
prognostic tests.” Lawrence Gostin, Genetic Discrimination: The Use of Genetically Based 
Diagnostic and Prognostic Tests By Employers and Insurers, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 109, 110 
(1991). That definition is underinclusive, as information providing the opportunity for dis-
parate treatment can be obtained through means other than tests. Family history and 
manifestation of illness related to genetic conditions are other avenues for discovering ge-
netic information that could be used to discriminate. See Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. 
Hodge, Jr., Genetic Privacy and the Law: An End to Genetics Exceptionalism, 40 
JURIMETRICS J. 21, 51 (1999); see also Phillip B. Reilly, Genetic Discrimination, in GENETIC 
TESTING AND THE USE OF INFORMATION 106, 107 (Clarisa Long ed., 1999) (describing his-
tory of use of term); Jennifer S. Geetter, Coding for Change: The Power of the Human Ge-
nome to Transform the American Health Insurance System, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 1, 2 (2002) 
(claiming “genetic discrimination” eludes definition). 
 4. See Colin S. Diver & Jane Maslow Cohen, Genophobia: What Is Wrong With Ge-
netic Discrimination?, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1441 (2001); Henry T. Greely, Genotype 
Discrimination: The Complex Case For Some Legislative Protection, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 
1483, 1488 (2001); Zita Lazzarini, What Lessons Can We Learn From The Exceptionalism 
Debate (Finally)?, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 149, 150 (2001); Lainie Friedman Ross, Genetic 
Exceptionalism vs. Paradigm Shift: Lessons from HIV, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 141, 141 
(2001); Sonia M. Suter, The Allure And Peril of Genetics Exceptionalism: Do We Need Spe-
cial Genetics Legislation?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 669, 670 (2001). 
 5. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Understanding Prohibitions Against Genetic Discrimi-
nation in Insurance, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 123, 123-24 (1999); Mark A. Hall, Legal Rules And 
Industry Norms: The Impact Of Laws Restricting Health Insurers’ Use of Genetic Informa-
tion, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 93, 94 (1999); Mark A. Hall & Stephen S. Rich, Genetic Privacy 
Laws And Patients’ Fear Of Discrimination by Health Insurers: The View from Genetic 
Counselors, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 245, 247 (2000); Mark A. Rothstein & Sharona Hoff-
man, Genetic Testing, Genetic Medicine, and Managed Care, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 849, 
851 (1999). 
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derwriters. First, the genetic code as our “book of life,”6 through 
which actuaries may thumb to ascertain our future health history, is 
a seriously strained metaphor.7 The relationship between our genetic 
makeup and our health is complex. Very few diseases have clear re-
lationships with a single genetic characteristic. Most diseases have 
complex causes, some genetic and some environmental.8 Genetic test-
ing is, therefore, in most cases a very imperfect means of projecting 
future illness. Second, genetic treatments have not materialized at a 
rate that creates a major impact on health care costs, suggesting that 
insurers will be unlikely to undertake aggressive steps to limit access 
to this category of care. Third, most Americans with health insurance 
coverage are not in plans that medically underwrite. Instead, they 
are covered by Medicare, Medicaid, or large employment-based 
groups that determine coverage on the basis of group membership or 
categorical status and not on the basis of medical condition.9 
 Nevertheless, genetic discrimination is both controversial and im-
portant. It is controversial because the suggestion that people will be 
denied coverage or care on the basis of their genetic makeup is 
viewed as quintessentially unjust. To the extent that advantage 
should follow desert, genetic discrimination is disfavored for disad-
vantaging people on the basis of characteristics irrevocably set at the 
moment of conception. In addition, use or abuse of genetic informa-
tion threatens to reveal intimate physical information.10 As is true 
with any intimate information, its disclosure may be embarrassing. 
Perhaps more significantly, this intimate genetic information is often 
unwelcome even to the subject—many of us do not want to know the 
future.11 The major emphasis of the genetic discrimination discus-
sion, however, is on the use to which genetic information is put. It 
may be used to treat people disparately in employment, social rela-
tionships, and access to services.12  
 Some instances of alleged disparate treatment have been the sub-
                                                                                                                    
 6. See Elizabeth Pennisi, Finally, the Book of Life and Instructions for Navigating It, 
288 SCIENCE 2304, 2305 (2000); see also NICHOLAS WADE, LIFE SCRIPT 19 (2001). 
 7. See LORI B. ANDREWS, FUTURE PERFECT: CONFRONTING DECISIONS ABOUT 
GENETICS, 148-49 (2001); Greely, supra note 4, at 1486-87; Suter, supra note 4, at 688-89. 
 8. Greely, supra note 4, at 1486-87. 
 9. Id. at 1488. 
 10. See Diver & Cohen, supra note 4, at 1440-41. 
 11. See Rothstein & Hoffman, supra note 5, at 852-53. 
 12. 143 CONG. REC. S7863-01 (July 22, 1997) (statement of Sen. Daschle) (“Many em-
ployers may not hire individuals whom they believe will require time off . . . [because of a 
genetic] disease[,]” even though genetic testing only indicates a predisposition to the dis-
ease and not the actual development of the disease itself); President William J. Clinton, 
Remarks on Genetic Discrimination at the White House Office of the Press Secretary (Feb. 
8, 2000) (transcript available at http://www.ofcn.org/cyber.serv/teledem/pb/2000/feb.html) 
(on file with author); Extension of remarks by Hon. Louise McIntosh Slaughter, Preventing 
Genetic Discrimination in Health Insurance  (Jan. 7, 1997) (transcript available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query) (on file with author). 
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ject of enforcement activity.13 Generally applicable genetic discrimi-
nation statutes address disparate treatment on the basis of genetic 
makeup.14 These statutes employ two strategies for combating such 
discrimination.15 The first is to maintain confidentiality with respect 
to genetic information through privacy rules.16 This forestalls the op-
portunity for disparate treatment by holding close the data on the 
basis of which type of discrimination might occur. The second is to 
prohibit or regulate the use of genetic information when testing is 
permitted or information is otherwise disclosed.17 This strategy en-
forces the legislature’s judgment of the acceptable and unacceptable 
circumstances in which genetic condition may be taken into account, 
for example, in employment or public accommodations decisions. 
 In the health insurance context, “genetic discrimination” can thus 
be a remarkably plastic term and requires separate analysis. “Dis-
crimination” in insurance law is often not a term of approbation, but 
rather refers to a common task of actuaries: the assortment of risks 
according to their likely realization and cost. Such assortment has 
been grist for the mill for insurers and actuaries, as they attempt to 
match the price of coverage against its likely cost and to charge ap-
plicants for coverage according to their (hopefully relevant) individ-
ual characteristics. Under some circumstances, insurance law re-
quires such discrimination, forcing firms to charge premiums for cov-
erage of risks in relation to the expected cost of such coverage.18 
 In recent years, discrimination in insurance (genetic discrimina-
tion in particular) has come to be used to describe circumstances in 
                                                                                                                    
 13. EEOC v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., No. 02-C-0456 (E.D. Wis. May 8, 
2002). A 2.2 million dollar settlement was awarded to thirty-six individuals who were sub-
jected to genetic testing by their employer after developing Carpal Tunnel Syndrome. 
 14. In Ohio: 
 No health insurance corporation, in processing an application for coverage for 
health care services under an individual or group health insuring corporation pol-
icy, contract, or agreement or in determining insurability under such a policy, 
contract, or agreement, shall do any of the following: 
 (1) Require an individual seeking coverage to submit to genetic testing or 
screening 
 (2) Take into consideration the results of genetic screening or testing 
 (3) Make any inquiry to determine the results of genetic screening or testing 
 (4) Make a decision adverse to the applicant based on entries in medical re-
cords or other reports of genetic screening or testing 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1751.64(B) (West 2001). 
 In New Mexico: “Discrimination by an insurer against a person or member of the per-
son’s family on the basis of genetic analysis, genetic information or genetic propensity is 
prohibited.” N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-4(A) (Michie 2001). 
 15. Diver & Cohen, supra note 4, at 1444-45. 
 16. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. Ch. 10-3-1104.7(1)(c) (2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. Ch. 10:5-5 
(2001). 
 17. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Ch. 1751.64 (2002); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-909(c)(1) 
(2001). 
 18. See infra text accompanying notes 59-60. 
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which insurers use applicants’ or insureds’ characteristics to treat 
them differentially, in a manner disapproved of by legislatures. Ge-
netic discrimination in health coverage usually refers to one of two 
different genetic sorting techniques. The first, which might be called 
discrimination in underwriting, occurs when a health insurer19 uses 
genetic characteristics to determine whether to provide coverage to a 
person. The second, which might be called discrimination in cover-
age, occurs when a health insurer makes decisions on the basis of 
genetic characteristics to pay for particular treatment. 
 Genetic discrimination statutes regulate both the disclosure and 
use of genetic information in the insurance relationship.20 They seek 
to assure that an individual’s genetic information will not leak out of 
the insurance process to taint his or her other public and private re-
lationships. In addition, these statutes directly shape the insurance 
relationship by setting out whether and when genetic information 
may be employed by insurers. These latter statutory ends, governing 
the use of genetic information by insurers, reach both the irrational 
and the rational use of genetic information. While the roots of genetic 
discrimination laws are in the history of irrational genetic informa-
tion, such as the use of carrier status for sickle cell anemia as a pre-
dictor of primary disease expression, current laws clearly prohibit 
the use of genetic information under circumstances when its use 
would undoubtedly be entirely rational.21 The next Section examines 
the varied laws governing genetic discrimination in health insurance. 
II.   THE LAW’S RESPONSE TO GENETIC DISCRIMINATION                           
IN HEALTH INSURANCE 
A.   Federal Law 
1.   The Murky Role of the ADA 
 The ADA recites a congressional finding that America should as-
sure people with disabilities “equality of opportunity, full participa-
tion, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency”22 and a statu-
tory purpose of “the elimination of discrimination against individuals 
with disabilities.”23 President George H. Bush spoke expansively at 
the Act’s signing, predicting that the ADA would advance the day 
                                                                                                                    
 19. “Health insurer” here broadly includes private insurance companies, employment-
based health and welfare plans, or other entities administering plans responsible for pay-
ing health-related costs incurred by members, whether or not they are “insurers” for pur-
poses of state insurance law. 
 20. Diver & Cohen, supra note 4, at 1443-44; Suter, supra note 4, at 691-92. 
 21. See Abraham, supra note 5, at 127; Greely, supra note 4, at 1500; John V. Jacobi, 
The Ends of Health Insurance, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 311, 332-33 (1997). 
 22. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (2000). 
 23. Id. § 12101(b)(1). 
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“when no Americans will ever again be deprived of their basic guar-
antee of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”24 The United 
States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission25 and others26 
opined that the ADA is sufficiently broad to reach and prohibit ge-
netic discrimination in health insurance. For two reasons,27 however, 
it is now increasingly clear that the ADA will not be so interpreted. 
 First, the ADA protects against disability discrimination only 
those with an “impairment that substantially limits . . . major life ac-
tivities,”28 those with a “record of such an impairment,”29 and those 
“regarded as having such an impairment.”30 The Supreme Court has 
found that the ADA’s definitions set a “demanding standard” for dis-
ability.31 The individual’s condition must be such that it “prevents or 
severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of cen-
tral importance to most people’s lives.”32 In addition, the condition 
must presently cause a substantial limitation; it is not sufficient that 
the condition did in the past, or may in the future, limit an individ-
ual’s actions.33 
 An individual with an unexpressed genetic trait has a greater or 
lesser probability of developing an illness, depending on the relation-
ship between the genetic trait and the disease.34 It is unlikely, how-
ever, that he or she presently experiences any limitations on daily ac-
tivities.35 In addition, it is unlikely that he or she would be able to es-
                                                                                                                    
 24. President George Bush, Remarks by the President During the Ceremony for the 
Signing of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (July 26, 1990), in THE LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 844 (G. John Tysse ed., 1991). 
 25. Paul Steven Miller, Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace, 26 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 189, 191 (1998) (citing EEOC Compliance Manual, §§ 902-946 (1995)). 
 26. See Frances H. Miller & Philip A. Huvos, Genetic Blueprints, Employer Cost-
Cutting, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 369, 374-75 (1994). 
 27. There is an additional reason beyond the two described in the text for doubting 
that the ADA could effectively limit genetic discrimination in health insurance. Where the 
defendant is an insurer or insurance broker, a growing but not unanimous body of law 
holds that the protections against discrimination in public accommodations under Title III 
of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181–12189 (2000), do not reach the contents of insurance prod-
ucts but only equal access to the opportunity to purchase such coverage, however limited 
that coverage may be on the basis of disability. See Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2000); Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 
563 (7th Cir. 1999); Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 608 (3d Cir. 1998). But 
see Carparts Distrib. Ctr. v. Auto Wholesalers Ass’n of New Eng., Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 19-20 
(1st Cir. 1994); Boots v. N.W. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 77 F. Supp. 2d 211, 213-16 (D.N.H. 1999). 
 28. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000). 
 29. Id. § 12102(2)(B). 
 30. Id. § 12102(2)(C). 
 31. Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 194 (2002). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482-83 (1999). 
 34. Greely, supra note 4, at 1485. 
 35. It may be that an inheritable genetic condition impairs the ability of a person to 
engage in the activity of reproduction, for fear of transmitting the condition to offspring. 
See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1998) (finding that an HIV infection con-
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tablish that the insurer “regarded [him or her] as” disabled.36 This 
“regarded as” prong of the ADA is met only if “a covered entity mis-
takenly believes that a person has a physical impairment that sub-
stantially limits one or more major life activities, or . . . mistakenly 
believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits 
one or more major life activities.”37 In the absence of the covered en-
tity’s erroneous belief in a current impairment substantially limiting 
major life activities, a person may not state a claim of disability un-
der the “regarded as” prong. Because a person with an unexpressed 
genetic condition is unlikely to be regarded as “disabled,” then he or 
she may not state a claim under the ADA. 
 The second barrier to an ADA action to remedy genetic discrimi-
nation in insurance is the statute’s insurance “safe harbor” provision. 
Congress did not leave the relationship between insurance practices 
and disability to be interpreted according to the ADA’s general provi-
sions, but spoke to coverage issues directly in § 501(c).38 This section 
permits insurers and employers providing either insured or self-
insured plans to engage in traditional risk classification practices so 
long as such practices are not a “subterfuge” for unlawful discrimina-
tion.39 Depending on the definition of “subterfuge,” § 501(c) can be a 
permissive safe harbor for covered entities or a substantial protection 
for people with disabilities. As with the application of the term “dis-
ability” to individuals with unexpressed genetic traits, the EEOC 
weighed in early on with an interpretation that has met with little 
respect in the courts. 
 The EEOC issued compliance guidance in 1993 in which it inter-
preted § 501(c) as requiring that risk classification for health benefits 
purposes be “justified by the risks or costs” associated with cover-
                                                                                                                    
trolled an individual’s decision to have a child). But the Court in Toyota Motor held that a 
finding of disability based on severe impairment of the activity of reproduction must be 
made on a “case by case basis.” 534 U.S. at 195 (quoting 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 
1630.2(j) (2001)). 
 36. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (2000). 
 37. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489. 
 38. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (2000). 
 39. Section 501(c) permits an insurance company or seller of “bona fide” coverage sub-
ject to state law and sponsors of “bona fide” health coverage subject to state law to under-
write, classify, and administer risks in conformity with state law. 42 U.S.C. § 
12201(c)(1)(2). It also permits any person to sponsor or administer a plan of health cover-
age not subject to state law so long as the plan is “bona fide.” 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(3). In 
this context, “bona fide” merely means that the plan “‘exists and pays benefits.’” Fitts v. 
Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, 236 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. 
of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 166 (1989)). “No covered entity, notwithstanding the per-
missive language of § 201(c) generally, may use a benefits plan as a ‘subterfuge’ to evade 
the employment and public accommodations provisions of the ADA.” 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c). 
As is discussed in the text, the meaning of “subterfuge” in this context has been controver-
sial. 
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age.40 A principal means by which the EEOC suggested a covered en-
tity could justify differential treatment of risks, such as the capping 
of coverage for one condition but not another, is by producing “legiti-
mate actuarial data” to prove that all actuarially similar conditions 
are treated in the same manner.41 This principle of actuarial equiva-
lence was accepted early on by some courts,42 although it has been re-
jected more recently by the circuit courts that have considered the is-
sue.43 
 The contrary (and now prevailing) interpretation of § 501(c) re-
jects the requirement of actuarial equivalence. Instead, it reads “sub-
terfuge” as consistent with the use of the term in the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act (“ADEA”).44 The clear modern trend is to 
interpret “subterfuge” as “‘a scheme, plan, stratagem, or artifice of 
evasion.’”45 Interpreting the ADEA, the Supreme Court has rejected 
both the legislative history and EEOC guidance suggesting a differ-
ent meaning of subterfuge and has instead adhered to a “dictionary” 
interpretation of a specific intent to evade the non-discrimination re-
quirements of the statute.46 Courts have rejected similar reliance on 
legislative history and EEOC guidance for an interpretation of the 
ADA and have required plaintiffs asserting subterfuge to demon-
strate more than mere absence of actuarial equity and instead to 
demonstrate a conscious plan to discriminate.47 
 Under the now-prevailing view of the law, therefore, an individual 
seeking to employ the ADA to remedy an instance of alleged genetic 
discrimination in health coverage would face two barriers. If she has 
suffered discrimination on the basis of unexpressed genetic traits, an 
ADA claim would likely fail for lack of standing—an unexpressed ge-
netic trait is unlikely to be considered disabling. Should an individ-
ual cross that barrier by, for example, establishing that the unex-
pressed genetic trait substantially interferes with her reproductive 
                                                                                                                    
 40. EEOC, Interim Enforcement Guidance on Application of ADA to Disability Based 
Distinctions in Employer Provided Health Insurance, N-915.002, § III(C)(2) (June 8, 1993). 
The EEOC Compliance manual has been amended and this section now appears in EEOC 
Compliance Manual, No. 915.003, § (IV)(B) (2000), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/ 
docs/benefits.html (on file with author). 
 41. EEOC Compliance Manual, No. 915.003, § III(C)(2)(a),(b) (2000), available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/benefits.html (on file with author). 
 42. See, e.g., Doukas v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 950 F. Supp. 422, 432 (D.N.H. 1996). 
 43. See, e.g., Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 204 F.3d 392 (2d Cir. 2000); Leonard F. 
v. Isr. Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 104-05 (2d Cir. 1999); Ford v. Schering-Plough 
Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 611-12 (3d Cir. 1998); EEOC v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 2000 WL 
1024700 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2000). 
 44. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000). 
 45. Leonard F., 199 F.3d at 105 (quoting United Air Lines, Inc., v. McMann, 434 U.S. 
192, 203 (1977)). 
 46. Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 170-72 (1989); see 
McMann, 434 U.S. at 203. 
 47. Leonard F., 199 F.3d at 104-06. 
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activities,48 she would be faced with the burden of establishing that 
the coverage decision is not protected by the insurance safe harbor. 
Most critically, she would have to demonstrate that the coverage was 
guided not “merely” by business judgment, but rather was motivated 
by discriminatory animus and a desire to harm the individual be-
cause of her genetic condition.49 
2.   HIPAA’s Specific but Limited Protections 
 The general disability discrimination provisions of the ADA do 
not, then, reach genetic discrimination. Bills establishing general ge-
netic discrimination prohibitions have been proposed,50 but none has 
been adopted to date. Congress did address an aspect of genetic dis-
crimination in health coverage as part of the Health Insurance Port-
ability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”).51 HIPAA protects the 
“portability” of health coverage by requiring, inter alia, that group 
health plans limit periods of exclusion from coverage for preexisting 
conditions, thereby permitting workers to change jobs without risk-
ing loss of coverage for ongoing conditions.52 HIPAA bars group plans 
from considering unexpressed genetic conditions as “preexisting con-
ditions” for purposes of coverage limitation,53 and bars plans from 
considering genetic information in making membership eligibility de-
                                                                                                                    
 48. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1998). But see Toyota Motor Mfg. v. 
Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 195 (2002). 
 49. See Betts, 492 U.S. at 168-75 (describing the difference between the (rejected) 
business justification rule under the ADEA and the subjective animus rule affirmed by the 
Court). 
 50. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2002, S. 1995, 107th Cong. (2002) 
(prohibiting health insurers from using genetic information to impose enrollment restric-
tions or adjust group premiums, making it unlawful for an employer to discriminate based 
on genetic information, and requiring genetic information to be treated as part of a confi-
dential medical record); Genetic Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance and Employment 
Act of 2001, H.R. 602, 107th Cong. (2001) (making it unlawful to discriminate because of 
genetic information in employment and prohibiting health plans from discriminating in 
enrollment, eligibility contribution rates, or premiums based on genetic information); 
Genetic Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance and Employment Act of 2001, S. 318, 
107th Cong. (2001) (making it unlawful for an employer to discriminate because of pro-
tected genetic information; an employer can request, require, collect, or purchase informa-
tion if used for monitoring of biologic effects of workplace toxic substances; also, a group 
health plan or a health insurance issuer cannot discriminate in enrollment in health in-
surance based on genetic information). 
 51. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1955 (1996) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1181-1182 and 
42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg to 300gg-41); see generally Coleen E. Medill, HIPAA and its Related 
Legislation: A New Role for ERISA in the Regulation of Private Health Care Plans, 65 
TENN. L. REV. 485 (1998). 
 52. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1955 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a) 
(2000)); see Diver & Cohen, supra note 4, at 1449-50; Rothstein & Hoffman, supra note 5, 
at 869. 
 53. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1955 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(b)(1)(B) 
(2000)). 
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terminations.54 
 This protection, unlike that of the ADA, clearly applies to genetic 
conditions and has some concrete, if limited, value in preventing ge-
netic discrimination. For group coverage, it limits the use of genetic 
information by imposing periods of exclusion from coverage and 
determining group eligibility. It provides for “continuation coverage” 
and guaranteed renewal from sellers of individual coverage for indi-
viduals with a sufficiently long history of continuous coverage, and 
prohibits insurers from citing genetic conditions to avoid those re-
quirements.55 Plans are free, however, to decline to cover particular 
treatments or to impose “limitations or restrictions on the amount, 
level, extent, or nature of the benefits or coverage” as they see fit.56 In 
addition, the term “genetic information” is not a defined term, and 
the extent of the protection offered from genetic discrimination is 
therefore uncertain. 
B.   State Laws: Evolution and Limits 
 Federal law provides only very limited protection from genetic 
discrimination in health coverage. The ADA is likely to be totally in-
effective in this area, and HIPAA provides only limited benefits. 
State genetic discrimination legislation has expanded into this near-
vacuum. Insurance has long been regulated in the first instance by 
the states, a tradition formalized with the 1948 passage of the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act.57 State law regulating health insurance has 
shifted over time, moving from limited regulation to protect free 
markets for health insurance to more intrusive regulation imposing 
restrictions on insurance practices for the purpose of advancing so-
cial goals. 
 Selecting among and accurately quantifying risk is a core task for 
insurance companies. Firms seek to assess risk more precisely than 
their competitors and (where prices may easily be varied) match the 
premium closely to the expected cost of coverage or (where prices are 
less easily varied) choose to offer coverage to better risks and to de-
                                                                                                                    
 54. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1955 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1(a)(1)(F) 
(2000)). 
 55. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1955 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-41, 
300gg-42 (2000)). 
 56. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1955 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(a)(2)(B) 
(2000)). 
 57. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2000). Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, “The business 
of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several 
States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business.” Id. § 1012(a). Further, 
“[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to . . . supersede any law enacted by any State for 
the purpose of regulating the business of insurance . . . unless such Act specifically relates 
to the business of insurance.” Id. § 1012(b). 
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cline coverage to poorer risks.58 State regulation of insurance histori-
cally concerned itself with monitoring the solvency of insurance com-
panies and protecting insureds from outright fraud and misrepresen-
tation. To the extent state regulators concerned themselves with the 
mechanics of underwriting, they were concerned primarily with an 
abuse quite different from genetic discrimination. Regulators were 
concerned with favoritism shown to sophisticated purchasers, by 
which favored customers paid less than the expected cost of coverage 
while unsophisticated customers made up for the difference by pay-
ing above their actuarially “true” premium. 
 To combat this perceived flaw in the insurance market, states 
adopted unfair trade practices acts; these acts came to be interpreted 
as requiring insurers to segment insured populations by their level of 
actuarial risk in order to prevent the forced (or at least unknowing) 
subsidization of one group of insureds by another and instead to 
mandate “fair discrimination.”59 The principle that rating differen-
tials must be actuarially justified spawned the first state prohibi-
tions of genetic discrimination. These laws barred insurers from con-
sidering recessive genetic traits such as that for sickle cell anemia or 
Tay-Sachs when making rating or underwriting decisions.60 These 
statutes merely enforced the general rule requiring actuarial justifi-
cation, as the presence of the trait in and of itself bears no relation-
ship with an individual’s health risk.61 
 The next phase of state genetic discrimination legislation swept 
more broadly and varied from the actuarial validity principle. In the 
1990s, states began to adopt genetic discrimination statutes that 
barred insurers from considering genetic information that bore some 
relationship to the subject’s future health. These newer statutes 
barred insurers from taking into account genetic evidence that an in-
dividual might be more likely to experience an illness than a person 
without the genetic trait. These statutes barred the use of specifically 
identified genetic tests or the information gained from others’ use of 
                                                                                                                    
 58. See KENNETH ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK 67-68 (1986); SYLVIA A. LAW, BLUE 
CROSS: WHAT WENT WRONG? 75-77 (2d ed. 1976). 
 59. Jacobi, supra note 21, at 321-22; Leah Wortham, Insurance Classification: Too 
Important to be Left to the Actuaries, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 349, 381-86 (1986). States 
occasionally created exceptions to this “fair discrimination” requirement. For example, race 
is an actuarially valid factor in predicting life expectancy, but its use in pricing life insur-
ance is nevertheless widely prohibited by state law. ABRAHAM, supra note 58, at 76. 
 60. See Jacobi, supra note 21, at 331. 
 61. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-208 (West 2001) (barring insurance decisions 
based on “sickle-cell trait, thalassemia-minor trait, hemoglobin C trait, Tay-Sachs trait, or 
genetic trait that is harmless in itself”) (emphasis added). It is conceivable that there would 
be an actuarial justification for the use of such information in connection with health in-
surance that included dependent coverage, as the health of offspring could be affected. See 
Greely, supra note 4, at 1489. 
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these tests by insurers.62 These statutes part ways with the earlier 
model based on unfair trade practices acts: they bar the use of ge-
netic information even if it is clearly relevant to assessing risk. 
 These new statutes demonstrate a legislative determination to 
shift the meaning of non-discrimination from a principle requiring 
equal treatment absent an actuarial showing of difference to one re-
quiring equal treatment notwithstanding actuarial difference.63 More 
recent statutes adhere to the principle that it is inappropriate to 
charge individuals with the actuarial cost of their inherited traits 
and extend the protection even further. The protection is extended by 
barring the use of genetic information whatever its source. The pro-
hibition, then, extends beyond the use of laboratory test results, and 
encompasses information on “genetic characteristics” from any 
source and of any type.64 The evolution of these state statutes demon-
strates an uneven and incomplete but discernable progression from 
state policy protecting individuals from irrational discrimination in 
insurance practices to one protecting individuals from the rational 
but disfavored practice of actuaries’ taking into account genetic in-
formation in setting the availability, terms and conditions of cover-
age. 
III.   EQUALIZING COVERAGE: SHORT TERM CONCERNS 
 Genetic discrimination laws effect a social judgment that an indi-
vidual’s access to health coverage should not depend on the results of 
a genetic lottery. Legislators employ “addition by subtraction” to ac-
complish this goal. They subtract the factor of genetic condition from 
those permissibly considered in insurance decisions in order to add 
coverage to people who may otherwise be excluded. Long-term con-
cerns with this equalitarian strategy are examined in Part IV. How-
ever, in this Part, more immediate concerns are examined: Assuming 
the wisdom of and continuing political viability of the genetic anti-
discrimination movement, what implementation concerns must be 
addressed? 
 The first such concern is for drafting clarity. In many instances, 
genetic discrimination legislation fails to serve its apparently-
intended goals due to correctable incompleteness of the protections 
offered. The second concern is less readily remedied. The enforce-
ment of genetic discrimination prohibitions is premised on a trans-
                                                                                                                    
 62. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1104.7 (2002) (prohibiting the use of ge-
netic test results for health insurance underwriting or rating purposes); MINN. STAT. § 
72A.139 (2001).  
 63. See Health Ins. Ass’n of Am. v. Corcoran, 551 N.Y.S.2d. 615, 618 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1990), aff’d mem., 565 N.E.2d 1264 (N.Y. 1990); see also Jacobi, supra note 21, at 331-32. 
 64. See CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.3 (West 2002); HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10A-118 (2001); 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-7, 100 (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:30-12(e) (West 2002). 
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parency of methods that no longer characterizes the relevant aspects 
of the insurance business. The prohibition of overt discrimination is 
no longer sufficient (if it ever was). The managed care transformation 
of insurance practices forces attention to less visible practices con-
trolled not by simple directives and commands, but by subtle nudges 
and incentives. Strategies for addressing both concerns are described 
in this Part. 
A.   Ambiguities in the Law: Speaking Clearly 
 Laws prohibiting genetic discrimination in health care are both 
largely untested and widely varied. They are largely untested for 
several reasons. First, few diseases have been identified definitively 
with particular genetic conditions. Diseases believed to be associated 
with genetic traits have not, as of yet, been connected by researchers 
to specific traits.65 Many diseases that have been linked to genetic 
components are related to more than one genetic anomaly, as well as 
environmental factors.66 The complex relationship between genetic 
information and disease confounds attempts to predict future illness 
solely, or primarily, on the basis of genetic information.67 The uncer-
tainty of the value of genetic information under such circumstances 
renders it insufficiently valuable in the risk assessment process to 
justify an insurer’s brooking the possible political and public disap-
proval associated with genetic underwriting.68 It is likely, however, 
that advances in genetics will produce information sufficiently pre-
dictive of future illness to render genetic underwriting economically 
plausible.69 
 When insurers find genetic information economically interesting, 
the differences among the state statutes will begin to matter. As is 
described more fully above, statutes prohibiting or regulating the use 
of genetic information by insurers fall into three general categories: 
those barring the use of genetic information irrelevant to the as-
sessment of risk; those barring the use of information derived from 
specifically identified laboratory tests; and those barring the use of 
broadly defined “genetic information.”70 The first species of discrimi-
nation is irrational, and the enforcement of insurance practices 
should be grist for the mill for state insurance departments. The sec-
ond and third, however, forbid rational insurer activity by imposing 
                                                                                                                    
 65. See Greely, supra note 4, at 1493. 
 66. Id. at 1484-86; Rothstein & Hoffman, supra note 5, at 855-56. 
 67. Diver & Cohen, supra note 4, at 1454-55. 
 68. See ABRAHAM, supra note 58, at 67-68. 
 69. See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 3, at 26-27; Rothstein & Hoffman, supra note 5, at 
855-57; John R.W. Yates, Medical Genetics, 312 BRIT. MED. J. 1021, 1021-24 (1996) (recog-
nizing advances in the use of genetic information in predicting illness). 
 70. See supra Part II.B. 
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rules forbidding the use of information relevant to the assessment of 
risk. 
 Assuming advancements in science are sufficient to make the 
game worth the candle, insurers will have an interest in probing the 
statutes’ ambiguities.71 The lesson of the ADA suggests that ambigu-
ous language will be interpreted to narrow, not broaden, the statu-
tory protections. As the ADA has been interpreted under the shadow 
of resistance to the cost of accommodation, so would genetic dis-
crimination statutes be interpreted under the shadow of the rising 
cost of health coverage. Ambiguous language in the ADA regarding 
the disability status of people suffering disparate treatment for dis-
abling conditions subject to correction has been interpreted to 
sharply narrow the ADA’s reach, notwithstanding substantial legis-
lative history and EEOC interpretative guidance to the contrary.72 
Similarly, ambiguous language in the ADA regarding insurance un-
derwriting practices affecting people with disabilities has been read 
to support pre-ADA risk segmentation practices, notwithstanding 
substantial legislative history and EEOC interpretative guidance to 
the contrary.73 In both cases, the language of the statute contained 
genuine ambiguity. In both cases the interpretation favoring a nar-
row construction, less costly to those required to comply with the 
statute, was favored. 
 The second wave of genetic discrimination statutes tends to con-
tain few serious ambiguities, but the statutes’ very specificity 
sharply limits their reach. They tend to prohibit only the use of spe-
cifically described laboratory tests for genetic traits.74 Laboratory 
tests not specifically prohibited by the statutes may therefore be 
permissible, as would any method of determining genetic traits not 
reliant on laboratory tests—for example, inquiring into family his-
tory of illness.75 The third wave of statutes corrects this flaw (if it is a 
flaw) by more broadly prohibiting the use of “genetic characteristics” 
(however discovered) in underwriting or pricing health insurance.76 
                                                                                                                    
 71. Self-interested insurers will begin to use genetic information when the tests are 
cost effective, scientifically accurate, predictively powerful, and lawful. See T.H. Cushing, 
Should There Be Genetic Testing in Insurance Risk Classification?, 60 DEF. COUNS. J. 249, 
252 (1993); Jacobi, supra note 21, at 327-31. 
 72. See supra text accompanying notes 35-38 (discussing Sutton v. United Air Lines, 
527 U.S. 471 (1999)). 
 73. See supra text accompanying notes 45-48 (discussing the trend toward reading the 
ADA’s “safe harbor” provision as permitting traditional actuarial methods). 
 74. Geetter, supra note 3, at 52; William F. Mulholland II & Ami S. Jaeger, Comment: 
Genetic Privacy and Discrimination: A Survey of State Legislation, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 317, 
320 (1999). 
 75. See Geetter, supra note 3, at 52; Greely, supra note 4, at 1495-96; Suter, supra 
note 4, at 702. 
 76. See CAL. INS. CODE § 10140(b) (West 2002); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431:10A-
118(b) (Michie 2002); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44:749 (2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5 
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These broader statutes avoid the over-specificity concerns of those of 
the second wave, but they will raise new interpretation concerns as 
courts attempt to determine what information is “genetic” and there-
fore excluded from insurers’ use.77 
 As genetic testing becomes an issue more practical than academic, 
the questions asked about genetic testing legislation will become 
more pointed. The lessons to be drawn from the ADA’s fate suggest 
that statutory ambiguity is the enemy of consumer protection. Legis-
latures, therefore, would be wise to consider how well their current 
law matches the goals they set for it. The reasons for passage of 
legislation barring or regulating the use of genetic information for 
health coverage purposes can be reduced to two. First, limitations on 
the use of genetic information may encourage people who would 
benefit from genetic testing to avail themselves of that technology. 
Absent such protection, they may be concerned that the results of 
genetic testing could impair their ability to obtain or retain health 
coverage. At sufficient levels, such concern could interfere with the 
scientific and therapeutic benefits of genetic testing.78 
 The second reason for passage of genetic discrimination legislation 
is the belief that such legislation makes health coverage more readily 
available. Having health coverage is a very good predictor of access 
to health care;79 access to health care is a primary good, one that all 
rational people find desirable;80 and the natural lottery of genetic en-
dowment is an inappropriate basis on which to allocate such an im-
portant good.81 Genetic discrimination legislation serves this goal by 
taking genetic information out of the allocative formula. 
                                                                                                                    
(West 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-4 (Michie 2002); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-508.4 (Mi-
chie 2001); see also Mulholland & Jaeger, supra note 74, at 320; Suter, supra note 4, at 
702-03. 
 Pending federal legislation appears to fit into the broader version of genetic discrimina-
tion statutes, although none has yet passed. See S. 318, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 602, 
107th Cong. (2001). 
 77. See Suter, supra note 4, at 702-04. 
 78. Id. at 707-08. 
 79. The Institute of Medicine’s Committee on the Consequences of Uninsurance re-
cently released its findings. It concluded: “In summary, uninsured adults receive health 
care services that are less adequate and appropriate than those received by patients who 
have either public or private health insurance, and they have poorer clinical outcomes and 
poorer overall health than do adults with private health insurance.” INST. OF MED., COMM. 
ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF UNINSURANCE, CARE WITHOUT COVERAGE: TOO LITTLE, TOO 
LATE 87 (2002); see also Diane Rowland et al., Uninsured in America: The Causes and Con-
sequences, in THE FUTURE OF THE U.S. HEALTHCARE SYSTEM: WHO WILL CARE FOR THE 
POOR AND UNINSURED? 25, 38 (Stuart H. Altman et al. eds., 1998) (“The research on differ-
ences in care patterns for uninsured versus insured individuals increasingly reveals that 
the uninsured are more likely to incur adverse health outcomes.”). 
 80. See Geetter, supra note 3, at 65-66; Suter, supra note 4, at 706-07. 
 81. See Geetter, supra note 3, at 65-66; Suter, supra note 4, at 706-07. 
2003]                          GENETIC DISCRIMINATION 379 
 
 Legislation serving the first goal is directed at the use of genetic 
information derived from genetic “tests,” for the evil to be avoided is 
not the differential treatment of people based on their genetic heri-
tage, but use of information derived from laboratory tests—tests oth-
erwise useful for scientific or therapeutic purposes. Some genetic dis-
crimination laws directed to this goal suffer from excessive specific-
ity, limiting coverage to specifically enumerated tests.82 Technology is 
advancing, and a wide variety of tests are used to ascertain different 
genetic conditions.83 Statutes intended to provide comfort that testing 
undertaken for research or therapeutic purposes cannot be used for 
insurance purposes must more broadly catalogue currently available 
technology and anticipate future developments. One means of doing 
so is to define the tests functionally, so as to capture laboratory tests 
analyzing human genetic material and proteins for the purpose of 
identifying inherited or genetic characteristics.84 
 As is described above, however, many recent genetic discrimina-
tion statutes are focused on the broader goal of preventing insurers 
from differentially treating individuals in underwriting and coverage 
decisions.85 States seek through these laws to interfere in the insur-
ance marketplace to limit the use of relevant risk-predicting informa-
tion related to genetic makeup. Unlike laws focused on laboratory 
tests, these more recent laws are premised on the notion that it is 
fundamentally unfair to differentially treat individuals for coverage 
purposes on the basis of immutable characteristics.86 It is natural, 
then, that these laws would bar insurers from considering genetic in-
formation beyond that revealed by laboratory tests, and extending to 
family history and health history.87 
 These statutes raise a set of interpretive concerns which are dif-
ferent from those raised by statutes limited to the results of labora-
tory tests. Fundamentally, laws banning consideration of information 
on genetic factors derived from any source are in substantial tension 
with general principles of risk assessment that continue to animate 
                                                                                                                    
 82. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 10147(e) (West 2002); MD. CODE ANN. INS. § 27-
909(a)(5) (2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 72A.139.2(b) (West 2002); see also Greely, supra note 
4, at 1494-96. 
 83. See THE N.Y. TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, GENETIC TESTING AND 
SCREENING IN THE AGE OF GENOMIC MEDICINE 31-40 (2000); Greely, supra note 4, at 1494-
96. 
 84. See Greely, supra note 4, at 1495 (describing MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 550.1401 
(West 2000), as an example of a law broadly defining genetic testing). 
 85. See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 3, at 51-52; Greely, supra note 4, at 1494-95. 
 86. See Geetter, supra note 3, at 65; Suter, supra note 4, at 706-07. 
 87. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-93-10(2) (Law. Co-op. 2001). (defining genetic information as 
“information about genes, gene products, or genetic characteristics derived from an indi-
vidual or a family member of the individual”); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(oo) (West 
2002) (defining genetic information as “information about genes, gene products or inher-
ited characteristics that may derive from an individual or family member”). 
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the business of health insurance.88 But short of that substantial con-
cern, these statutes raise definitional issues that can be resolved 
with careful drafting.89 Here, too, prudence suggests that legislatures 
consider precisely what circumstances beyond the results of labora-
tory tests are beyond the scope of consideration by insurers. One can 
infer at least probabilistic information about an individual’s genetic 
makeup from many sources, including the results of genetic tests of 
the individual’s relatives, the health history of the individual’s rela-
tives, results of the individual’s own genetic tests, and the individ-
ual’s own health history. Legislators can control the interpretation of 
genetic discrimination statutes if they clearly define what conditions 
may and may not be considered in the underwriting and coverage 
process. 
B.   Avoiding the Effect of Clear Laws: Covert Discrimination 
 The preceding Section cautions that the fate of the ADA suggests 
that vague consumer protection statutes will be eviscerated by 
courts. It further points out aspects of current genetic discrimination 
law that contain ambiguity, and suggests clarification. This Section 
assumes, first, that a jurisdiction has adopted genetic discrimination 
legislation90 of the third, or broadest, type as described in Part III.A. 
This type bars insurers from considering genetic information from 
any source in underwriting or coverage decisions.91 Second, it as-
sumes that the legislation has been drafted to avoid the textual am-
biguities discussed above.92 Clarity in legislative drafting, while im-
portant, is insufficient to implement public policy; the laws must be 
enforced. 
 Some enforcement is easy. Overt violations of core provisions of 
genetic discrimination laws can be detected and corrected by regula-
tors. For example, regulators can combat the solicitation of prohib-
ited information in insurance applications and contracts by requiring 
firms to file those forms for review prior to use.93 Similarly, regula-
tors can respond when informed that an insurer, using prohibited 
genetic criteria, is refusing to approve a treatment otherwise within 
the range of covered services. Much more troubling and difficult to 
regulate is covert cheating in either underwriting or coverage deci-
sions. History suggests that such covert cheating will occur in con-
                                                                                                                    
 88. See infra Part IV.A. 
 89. See Greely, supra note 4, at 1496-97. 
 90. For purposes of the discussion in this section, the legislation could be state or fed-
eral. The importance of the distinction between state and federal enactment of genetic-
discrimination legislation is addressed below in Part IV.A. 
 91. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65. 
 92. See infra Part III.A. 
 93. See CAL. INS. CODE § 882 (West 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2J-4 (West 2001). 
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nection with genetic discrimination laws, and that it will be difficult 
to control. 
 Insurers, interested in maintaining a competitive edge in risk as-
sessment,94 will have an interest in cheating at the enrollment stage 
to the extent they believe that the prohibited genetic information is 
relevant to the underwriting process. History suggests that some in-
surers subject to laws limiting their ability to use relevant risk data 
will seek to avoid the effects of the laws to avoid enrolling high-risk 
members. Both Medicare and Medicaid permit program beneficiaries 
to enroll in private managed care plans under some circumstances.95 
Both programs bar participating managed care plans from consider-
ing the health, experience, or other risk factors when enrolling pro-
gram beneficiaries in their plans.96 There is some evidence that 
Medicare HMOs, and better evidence that Medicaid HMOs, have 
screened applicants surreptitiously to favor low-risk beneficiaries.97 
 Enforcement of laws prohibiting insurers from considering risk in-
formation faces difficulties as it attempts to cabin activity which is 
quite fundamental to the history and economics of the business of in-
surance. Two paths may be taken. In the first, civil and criminal 
sanctions are levied against insurers who are discovered to have vio-
lated the laws, with the aim of specifically and generally deterring 
similar conduct in the future.98 The second path seeks methods to 
serve the goal of access for high-risk individuals while accommodat-
ing the income maximization impulses of the insurers. One such 
method would bar differential treatment of applicants on the basis of 
risk factors, but would recognize insurers’ higher costs. This recogni-
tion may come through adjusting premiums on the basis of risk. This 
is an appropriate strategy in a program such as Medicare, with a 
single payer.99 In the alternative, in a program in which community 
rating or other risk-leveling methods have been applied to markets 
with multiple purchasers, a reinsurance method may be adopted to 
compensate insurers with aggregate risk experience over a set 
                                                                                                                    
 94. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60. 
 95. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-21 (2000) (specifying enrollment requirements for Medi-
care); id. § 1396u-2 (specifying enrollment requirements for Medicaid). 
 96. See id. § 1395w-21(g) (specifying Medicare requirements); id. § 1396b(m)(2)(A)(v) 
(specifying Medicaid requirements). 
 97. See RICHARD KRONICK & JOY DE BEYER, MEDICARE HMOS: MAKING THEM WORK 
FOR THE CHRONICALLY ILL 10-11 (1999) (describing mixed evidence on whether Medicare 
HMOs engaged in improper risk-selection activity); Sharon L. Davies & Timothy Stoltzfus 
Jost, Managed Care: Placebo or Wonder Drug for Health Care Fraud and Abuse?, 31 GA. L. 
REV. 373, 387-88 (1997) (discussing Medicaid HMOs engaged in improper risk-selection ac-
tivity). 
 98. See Davies & Jost, supra note 97, at 387-88, 394-404. 
 99. See Joseph P. Newhouse et al., Risk Adjustment And Medicare: Taking A Closer 
Look, HEALTH AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 26. 
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threshold.100 This latter method “suppresses the incentive to engage 
in risk selection in various indirect and surreptitious ways” by assur-
ing some substantial recognition of the income loss otherwise result-
ing from the loss of risk assessment methods.101 
 Disparate treatment in plan enrollment is only half of the problem 
addressed in genetic discrimination legislation. The other major 
problem is discrimination in coverage—disparate treatment in decid-
ing which treatments will receive funding. Coverage discrimination 
occurs when insurers fail to approve funding for treatments that rely 
on genetic technology to treat genetic conditions102 or fail to approve 
conventional treatments for genetic conditions in circumstances in 
which treatment would otherwise be covered.103 Coverage discrimina-
tion occurs, and can be expected to occur in genetic circumstances for 
two reasons. First and most obviously, cost pressures and the result-
ing cost containment methods pioneered by managed care organiza-
tions increase the chances that care formally included in the contrac-
tual terms of the insurance plan will be improperly denied.104 
 Insurers may also engage in coverage discrimination as an alter-
native method of engaging in underwriting discrimination. Suppose a 
firm wishes to exclude individuals with presumably expensive ge-
netic conditions from its plan. Suppose further that the discrimina-
tion law clearly stated that genetic conditions could not be considered 
in the application or underwriting process and that the clear provi-
sions of the law were efficiently enforced. The firm may be unable—
without being caught—to prevent the individual from enrolling in 
the insurance plan. Under such circumstances, an insurer may 
choose to achieve indirectly what is denied directly by providing ser-
vices to the reluctantly-enrolled member in a way that discourages 
the member from remaining a plan member. 
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 There are several subtle ways for plans to discourage a member of 
a disfavored class of individuals with potentially expensive genetic 
conditions. They can strive for excellence in services of little interest 
to the disfavored class, while settling for mediocrity in areas of par-
ticular interest to that class. They can add extra services of interest 
to the unaffected population and hew to the basics in areas of inter-
est to the more expensive group. They can move more slowly and less 
efficiently with approvals and pre-certifications for disfavored ser-
vices, and target medical necessity utilization review to services of 
particular interest to people with genetic conditions.105 
 Clearly these actions would violate genetic discrimination laws if 
intentionally undertaken to drive away people with genetic condi-
tions—and perhaps even if such disparate treatment were not 
crafted for such a purpose. Further, they may be unwise from even a 
coldly-calculating business proposition in light of the spillover effects 
bad services to one class of insureds may have on the firm’s reputa-
tion with preferred classes of customers.106 But this harmful behavior 
may be economic in some circumstances and used as a method to 
drive away people who are perceived as bad risks.107 The potential for 
such behavior is taken sufficiently seriously to generate proposals to 
counter its effect. 
 Covert forms of discrimination are, of course, more difficult than 
overt forms to detect and remedy. In health insurance, there are at 
least two senses in which discrimination could be said to be covert. 
Covert discrimination could arise when an insurer decides to dis-
criminate and, in order to avoid detection, hides the decision and dis-
guises the result. The more common sense form of covert discrimina-
tion could arise in the health insurance arena through the natural 
action of a structure designed to limit utilization and subject that 
structure to a patchwork of only partially successful controls. The 
structure of modern health insurance is based on managed care. It is 
well understood that managed care plans control costs in part by cre-
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ating incentives for health care providers to reduce utilization.108 
 There is extensive literature on patient protection in managed 
care, and it will not be canvassed here.109 Suffice it to say that pro-
tecting individuals from genetic discrimination in the form of covert, 
improper coverage denials can be seen as within the broader enter-
prise of protecting individuals from covert denials of coverage by 
managed care organizations in general. Formal governmental en-
forcement has an important role in this enterprise, as regulators re-
view insurance plans for compliance with structural regulations cal-
culated to minimize the opportunity and incentive to stint on care.110 
One important form of such regulatory oversight is the close review 
of the contracts governing the relationship between insurers and 
consumers. This traditional form of regulation takes on added sig-
nificance as cost-containment pressures drive insurers to aggres-
sively control utilization.111 It is inescapable, however, that, in a 
health insurance system driven by market and not regulatory theory, 
consumer-driven checks against inappropriate denials of coverage 
are a more significant check.112 
 One consumer-driven corrective to stinting is formal or informal 
litigation. Consumers suffering improper denial of coverage can sue 
in the traditional sense, either under state contract law113 or section 
502 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”).114 
Much less formally, plan members can invoke internal grievance pro-
cedures to resolve coverage disagreements.115 An intermediate form 
of dispute resolution permits a plan member to appeal a denial of 
coverage to independent, outside reviewers. This independent review 
usually submits disputes to professionals unconnected to the plan 
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and certified by state insurance officials.116 This mechanism is sure to 
gain additional significance as a result of the Supreme Court’s recent 
finding that state laws mandating plans to cooperate in independent 
utilization review are not preempted by ERISA.117 One shortcoming 
of these adversarial mechanisms is that they require a “trigger 
event.” That is, patients are likely to invoke them when they have 
been denied coverage of a discrete treatment but are unlikely to in-
voke them when they have suffered the more diffuse harm of cover-
age for a lesser quality of care.118 Another shortcoming is that pa-
tients are unable to invoke them if they are unaware that they have 
been denied coverage. They are more likely to be unaware of such 
denials as insurers shift utilization decisions to physicians and as 
physicians therefore become less likely to notify patients of costly al-
ternatives.119 
 Other consumer protection devices must be available to consum-
ers to counter insurers’ stinting tendencies. A cluster of such devices 
accept market discipline as an alternative to direct government over-
sight and seek to supplement the tools available to consumers in 
their efforts to navigate health insurance markets. In market sys-
tems, quality is controlled by the cumulative conduct of individual 
purchasers, who reward producers willing to provide desired services 
at a reasonable price. Such market-driven quality assurance mecha-
nisms are effective only to the extent that consumers have sufficient 
information to judge the quality of services offered by market par-
ticipants.120 Some regulatory tools seek to take advantage of the 
natural tendency of markets to reward quality by empowering con-
sumers. This form of regulation is directed at improving the balance 
of information access between plans and consumers in order to en-
hance the ability of consumers to evaluate the quality of plans. The 
goal of such regulations is to reduce information deficits so that con-
sumers can reward with patronage the plans that deliver what all 
plans promise: high-quality care.121 
 The publication of evaluative data on health plans serves the goal 
of leveling the playing field between consumers and plans. Public en-
tities and private organizations such as the National Committee for 
Quality Assurance gather, analyze, organize, and publish data de-
scribing the structure and performance of plans.122  
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 In the context of genetic discrimination, such evaluative systems 
can serve two goals. First, they can facilitate determination of which 
plans are engaged in stinting activity by evaluating consumer sur-
veys, structural measures, and health outcomes for particular forms 
of treatment.123 Consumers concerned about the manifestations of 
genetic discrimination can thereby obtain a window into the behavior 
of various plans and choose accordingly. Second, they permit regula-
tors to monitor plan activity for early warning signs of stinting. Even 
if the population of consumers concerned about a form of genetic dis-
crimination is too small to have a powerful market impact, regulators 
could discern improper behavior by evaluating the data and audit the 
plan’s practices to determine if there has been a violation of the law. 
 In the event, then, that genetic science develops sufficiently in its 
diagnostic and therapeutic capabilities to render genetic discrimina-
tion a more significant problem than it now is, current genetic dis-
crimination statutes form a basis for the regulation of insurance to 
limit the effects of such discrimination in underwriting and coverage 
decisions. The statutes must be clarified, however, to make crystal 
clear the conduct that is prohibited; absent such clarity, genetic dis-
crimination statutes are likely to face the fate of the ADA: gradual 
diminution in effect due to courts’ constantly erring on the side of 
regulated entities and against the interests of consumers. In addi-
tion, regulators must apply to this form of improper insurance prac-
tice the array of consumer protection devices, now in their infancy, 
developed to protect consumers from the dark shunning and stinting 
tendencies of managed care organizations. These two steps are nec-
essary to assure the immediate ability of genetic discrimination stat-
utes to have an effect in the insurance market. The next Section ex-
plores the broader issues in insurance law and policy raised by ge-
netic discrimination statutes. 
IV.   THE FUTURE OF GENETIC DISCRIMINATION 
 The previous Part described implementation concerns that will 
arise if and when genetic science advances sufficiently to render ge-
netic discrimination in health insurance a substantial public policy 
concern. That Part assumed, in addition to advances in science, that 
a general agreement in genetic discrimination laws is intended to 
serve at least two goals: first, assuring individuals that the advan-
tages of genetic testing for diagnostic and research purposes would 
not be outweighed by the disadvantages attendant on the revelation 
of genetic information to insurers and others;  and second, ensuring 
that the “genetic lottery” is not used as a basis for differential treat-
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ment in health insurance underwriting or coverage decisions. This 
Part also adopts those assumptions and, in addition, assumes that 
the technical drafting and enforcement concerns raised in the previ-
ous Part have been resolved. It addresses the public policy concerns 
that would arise were genetic discrimination laws to have important 
application (because genetic discrimination had become economically 
advantageous to insurers) and effective structure (because drafting 
and enforcement concerns had been resolved).124 This Part addresses 
two such concerns, one related to the stability of the insurance mar-
ket and the other related to allocative equities arising during times 
of growing scarcity in health care resources. 
A.   Adverse Selection and Exceptionalism 
1.   Regulating Around Adverse Selection 
 Genetic discrimination statutes create—are intended to create—
information asymmetries between individuals and insurers, as indi-
viduals learn more about their future risk and insurers are prohib-
ited from sharing in that knowledge. It is unclear at this point how 
valuable such information will be for insurance purposes, as it is un-
certain how close the connection is between simple genetic variation 
and most illnesses.125 To the extent genetic tests develop strong pre-
dictive capability, their results may be valuable to individuals as 
they decide whether or not to invest in health insurance. If appli-
cants for coverage have access to prognostic information and insurers 
do not, adverse selection may come into play, with high-risk indi-
viduals opting for coverage and low-risk individuals opting out. An 
extreme version of this scenario has been described as follows: 
Customary protections against adverse selection—individual un-
derwriting, combined with preexisting conditions[,] exclusions, de-
ductibles, and coinsurance provisions—will prove less and less ef-
fective as a means of sorting applicants into actuarially sound risk 
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classifications. Cross-subsidization between low-risk insureds and 
high-risk insureds will intensify. Unable to sort high-risks into 
high-premium risk classifications, insurers will respond by in-
creasing premiums or restricting coverage across the board. 
Higher premiums will begin to drive many low-income, high-risk 
insureds and many lower-risk insureds of all income groups from 
the market.126 
 The problems posed by adverse selection may be of more technical 
than practical interest for several reasons.  First, most people with 
private health coverage obtain it as an incident of employment, a 
context in which there historically has been limited individual ex-
perience rating, and where lower-risk members and potential mem-
bers have had incentives to purchase coverage (where they explicitly 
share in the cost of coverage) that may overcome cost-based disincen-
tives derived from their knowledge of their low-risk status.127 Second, 
the distribution of genetic risk may be quite complex, frustrating at-
tempts to assort most individuals into valid categories based on ge-
netic risk. Insurers faced with expanding knowledge of genetic traits 
that have an effect on health only in complex combination with other 
genetic traits or with environmental conditions may not gain infor-
mation appropriate to the risk categorization of applicants. If, for ex-
ample, many applicants have a mixture of genetic indications of a 
low probability of many different illnesses, actuaries may be faced 
with a situation in which “the cost of refining classifications is not 
worth the competitive benefit derived,”128 and the genetic information 
may become background noise in the underwriting process. Third, 
low-risk individuals often decide to purchase health coverage even if 
the premium exceeds that reflecting their actuarial risk. That is, 
they may be sufficiently risk-averse to purchase “overpriced” cover-
age rather than risking the prospect of being uninsured in the event 
of a significant illness not related to genetics—for example, trau-
matic injury or illness caused by infectious disease.129 
 It may be, on the other hand, that genetic information will come to 
provide sufficiently significant information about risk to cause con-
siderable dislocations attributable to adverse selection in insurance 
markets. Regulation is not helpless to combat such effects. Genetic 
equity principles can be sustained notwithstanding the emergence of 
significant adverse selection problems, through the adoption of sev-
eral available corrective modifications to the insurance market. Some 
of these steps would be modest in nature, and some would require 
more radical change. 
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 Many states adopted reforms in the 1990s limiting the ability of 
health insurers to engage in risk selection. These statutes, aimed at 
individual and small group markets (the last bastions of the market 
permitting insurer risk selection), imposed explicit limits on the ex-
tent to which insurers could vary premiums on the basis of predicted 
risk and required insurers to offer coverage and to renew coverage 
once accepted.130 Legislators anticipated that these limits to risk se-
lection would produce some adverse selection, and they therefore in-
cluded in the reforms corrective measures. To encourage people to 
obtain coverage before the need for treatment arises, they permitted 
insurers to impose preexisting illness exclusions.131 The reforms 
barred insurers from using price differentials as a risk selection 
mechanism, and states anticipated that insurers may use plan de-
sign as a proxy, discouraging the enrollment of high-risk individuals 
by offering coverage deficient in services vital to people with chronic 
illnesses.132 To counter this effect, states mandated uniform standard 
coverage packages133 and instituted a variety of reinsurance mecha-
nisms which equalize the burden of covering high-risk subscribers.134 
 Although the record is ambiguous, these steps seem to have been, 
in some measure, successful in permitting states to shift individual 
and small group insurance markets to a more egalitarian footing, 
while avoiding extreme adverse selection;135 and similar mechanisms 
could likewise correct existing adverse selection problems caused by 
genetic discrimination laws. The stakes could be quite high. Absent 
regulatory correction, the adverse selection caused by substantial 
asymmetries of information between applicants and insurers could 
greatly impair the operation of insurance markets.136 Even if success-
ful, the corrective measures will require substantial regulatory over-
sight of insurance markets. The dislocations caused by implementing 
meaningful genetic discrimination laws evokes an important ques-
tion: why exclude genetic information and not other information pre-
dictive of future health status?137 The next Section briefly examines 
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the genetic exceptionalism debate. 
2.   Exceptionalism, Incrementalism, and Social Pooling 
 American insurance law has permitted or even encouraged insur-
ers to consider the risk profile of an individual or group applying for 
health coverage, although recent incremental changes in insurance 
law suggest a trend toward social pooling.138 Genetic discrimination 
laws forbid consideration of one form of relevant risk data.139 As was 
true with the (at times) exceptional treatment of HIV information,140 
the justification for the exceptional treatment of genetic information 
for purposes including underwriting and coverage decisions has been 
questioned.141 Should genetic information be treated differently than 
other health status information? 
 Genetic discrimination legislation’s two goals—encouragement of 
genetic testing for diagnostic and research purposes and protection of 
individuals from unfair coverage and treatment142—suggest different 
answers to this question. To the extent that the goal of genetic dis-
crimination laws is “only” to remove inhibitions to participation in 
genetic testing, exceptionalism arguments have some force. Unlike 
other health information, it is argued, genetic characteristics are 
immutable and invariably forecast future health conditions.143 Ge-
netic information, then, may loom uniquely large in the minds of 
people contemplating participation in genetic testing, and the social 
value of genetic testing is sufficiently high to support unique protec-
tions from others’ use of resulting genetic information. There is some 
force to these arguments. However, as understanding emerges of 
both the complexity of the genetic causes of disease and the complex-
ity of the relationship between genetics and environment for most 
diseases,144 this justification weakens.145 
 More comprehensive genetic discrimination laws are clearly moti-
vated by the second goal: genetic equity in coverage.146 The trend to-
ward these broader laws suggests a rejection of insurance underwrit-
                                                                                                                    
 138. See generally Jacobi, supra note 21, at 314-18. 
 139. See Abraham, supra note 5, at 127. 
 140. See Ronald Bayer, Public Health Policy and the AIDS Epidemic: An End to HIV 
Exceptionalism?, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1500 (1991). 
 141. For a more complete discussion of the genetic exceptionalism debate, one that en-
compasses primarily the issue of informational privacy but also the use of genetic informa-
tion, see, for example, Gostin & Hodge, supra note 3, at 21; Lazzarini, supra  note 4, at 149; 
Ross, supra note 4, at 141; Suter, supra note 4, at 669. 
 142. See supra text accompanying notes 79-82. 
 143. See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 3, at 34-35; Ross, supra note 4, at 142-43; Suter, 
supra note 4, at 710-15. 
 144. See Greely, supra note 4, at 1485-87. 
 145. See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 3, at 31-32; Ross, supra note 4, at 142-43; Suter, 
supra note 4, at 710-15. 
 146. See supra text accopanying notes 81-82. 
2003]                          GENETIC DISCRIMINATION 391 
 
ing and coverage decisions that differentiate on the basis of inherited 
traits, conditions clearly beyond the control of the individual. By 
passing broader genetic discrimination laws, legislators suggest that 
it is unfair to subject individuals to disadvantage in insurance pur-
chase or use on the basis of inherited characteristics.147  
 Taken in isolation, this view has considerable appeal. Viewed in 
the context of an insurance system traditionally governed by differ-
ential risk assessment, however, two observations should be made. 
First, as is discussed above, genetic discrimination laws may necessi-
tate substantial regulatory intervention to limit adverse selection.148 
In addition, however, there is the broader equity concern. While in-
dividuals with unfavorable genetic characteristics do not “deserve” 
resulting disadvantage in insurance access, it is not clear that they 
have any greater claim to remedial action than do individuals disad-
vantaged by reason of previous traumatic injury or infectious dis-
ease.149 No person who has or acquires characteristics, without her 
own fault, marking her as a high risk for future health utilization 
“deserves” lesser access to health coverage. 
 If, as it appears, genetic information is not sufficiently exceptional 
to separate it from other information useful in the process of risk se-
lection, genetic discrimination laws can be justified only as part of a 
larger incremental reform movement in health insurance. If the fu-
ture of the American health insurance system is a model in which in-
surers rely on risk selection where such business methods are eco-
nomically valuable, then selecting genetic conditions as an exception 
to the rule is difficult to justify. There is thin but suggestive evi-
dence, however, that the American health insurance system is mov-
ing incrementally toward a system in which access to coverage is not 
tied to risk and in which the guiding principle is not individual as-
sessment but social pooling to improve access to coverage and care. 
 Federal and state law has shifted in recent years to limit risk 
segmentation in insurance markets. As is described above, many 
states have adopted reforms limiting the ability of health insurers to 
engage in risk selection in individual and small group markets.150 In 
addition, HIPAA,151 passed in 1996, imposed federal restrictions on 
insurers’ ability to impose risk-related restrictions on coverage in 
some circumstances.152 The swift acceptance of genetic discrimination 
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laws, seen against this background, suggests that the law’s protec-
tions represent not merely a case of special pleading, but rather, they 
are part of a larger trend of incremental insurance reform. 
 Splashy, systemic reform of the American health insurance mar-
ket has famously failed.153 The failure of large-scale reform, however, 
was more a product of American skepticism of large government than 
a lack of public interest in making health coverage available on a 
more egalitarian footing.154 An argument can be made that incre-
mental reform is currently proceeding (slowly and unevenly) on two 
fronts in the direction of assuring access to health coverage, regard-
less of health status and ability to pay.  
 The first front is discussed above; it comprises laws moving away 
from risk segmentation and toward community rating and social 
pooling. This evolutionary movement increases the social cost of cov-
erage, in part, due to the cost of increased regulation and, in part, 
due to the increased risk profile of those covered.155 
 The second front for incremental reform concerns payment for 
coverage. Independent of the cost of insurance reform, the cost of 
health care coverage is rising rapidly.156 At the same time, long-term 
trends suggest that employment-based coverage is weakening, with 
less coverage and higher cost-sharing, particularly for low-income 
workers.157 Over time, the public sector has come to play a larger 
role, with nearly one-half of care now financed by public programs.158 
As low-income workers and their families found limited access to de-
cent employment-based health coverage,159 the government has 
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picked up the slack. Medicaid programs expanded, and programs 
covering low-income children and adults who are not eligible for 
Medicaid have been created.160 This trend slowed or even reversed 
briefly in the late 1990s, at the height of economic expansion.161 This 
pause is clearly temporary, as the end of extraordinarily good eco-
nomic times and increased health care cost inflation once again 
threaten the employment-based insurance system. As a recent analy-
sis concluded, 
[u]ltimately, the combination of higher growth in health care costs, 
through its effect on premiums, and a slowing economy threaten a 
major increase in the number of people who are uninsured. Evi-
dence is already appearing that small employers are dropping cov-
erage in response to sharp premium increases. When employers 
shield workers less from premium increases, rates of employee 
take-up will continue to fall.162 
 Putting these trends together, it can be predicted that private in-
surance coverage will continue to erode and that government will be 
called upon to finance coverage for an increasingly large percentage 
of the population. Further, the public program expansions in recent 
years have often been structured so as to permit government to sim-
ply purchase coverage from private insurers.163 Government gains 
comfort as a purchaser of coverage if the market from which it selects 
coverage is structured according to policies consistent with broad 
coverage of individuals of all risk categories; government (as a pur-
chaser of coverage) is not served by insurance markets designed to 
limit coverage to those most in need of access to health care. 
 The pieces of this incrementalist reform agenda, then, include 
both a shift in regulatory structure toward social pooling and away 
from individual risk selection and an increasing commitment of pub-
lic funds to finance the purchase of coverage for those priced out of 
the market. As has been stated, the evidence that insurance markets 
are moving in the right direction is thin but suggestive. The evidence 
that government will continue the trend of financing a greater por-
tion of health care is no more certain.164 The next Section assumes, 
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somewhat hopefully, that some version of incremental reform is 
adopted and that broad coverage is available to all, independent of 
their ability to pay or the market’s evaluation of their risk status. It 
raises questions regarding the effects of scarcity in health services on 
access to services for people with genetic conditions. 
B.   Scarcity and Equity 
 Genetic discrimination laws were enacted before substantial need 
arose and reflected, in part, a social consensus that people with ge-
netic conditions suggestive of future health risk should not be dis-
parately treated in health insurance underwriting and coverage deci-
sions. The discussion above describes appropriate steps for crafting 
and enforcing genetic discrimination laws in order to achieve that 
goal and suggests effects that these laws may have on health insur-
ance markets in the future. The previous Section argues that genetic 
discrimination legislation’s effect on health insurance markets is 
consistent with a trend of incremental reform of America’s health in-
surance market toward an ethos of social pooling, in which market-
place tendencies to exclude those most in need of health coverage 
would be subverted in the service of broader access to care. 
 The previous discussion somewhat artificially excluded considera-
tion of health care cost inflation in gauging the strength of the social 
commitment to genetic equity. This Section briefly sketches out the 
cost containment and rationing pressures that are likely to arise in 
the near future and concludes that explicit genetic discrimination 
should be firmly in place before those pressures become strong. It is 
not unlikely that strong pressures to ration care will coincide with 
the time when genetic science has advanced sufficiently to test social 
resolve in favor of genetic equity. When the pressure to ration medi-
cally useful care becomes strong, abstract concepts of equity may face 
critical reevaluation. 
 The pressure to ration, of course, derives from health care cost in-
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flation. After a brief hiatus, health care cost inflation has returned 
with a vengeance.165 Two prominent health finance analysts have 
demonstrated that health care inflation well above the rate of back-
ground inflation has been the norm for the past four decades, with 
brief periods of low inflation, and notwithstanding a wide variety of 
strategies to corral health care costs: 
[N]either regulation, voluntary action by the health care industry, 
nor managed care and market competition have had a lasting ef-
fect on our nation’s health care costs. Some might argue that we 
were not serious or comprehensive enough about any one of these 
approaches for them to have had a lasting impact. On the other 
hand, it could be argued that the point is academic; we were as se-
rious as public and political support for any one approach would 
allow.166 
The authors suggest that the cost-containment efforts are doomed to 
fail until the need for rationing is faced; in the alternative, they sug-
gest that the cost history is traceable to “the American people’s un-
containable desire for the latest and best health care,” which will not 
lessen and which dooms us to an ever-rising spiral of cost.167 
 Henry Aaron argues that the resurgence of health care cost infla-
tion is to be expected and is consistent with decades-old trends. He 
suggests, in fact, that the factors leading to inflation are intensify-
ing.168 The factors that will only increase in salience over time are 
technological innovation in health care (particularly pharmaceuti-
cals) and an aging population; the one-time factor is the bounce-back 
from spent managed care cost-containment efforts.169 As Americans’ 
appetite for innovative treatments is only exceeded by the interest of 
entrepreneurial health care firms and professionals, the technologi-
cal inflation driver is sure to continue in force. Similarly, the popula-
tion is aging—a good thing, given the alternative—and therefore re-
quires more and more intense services. 
 In the short run, Americans are likely to react to health inflation 
as we always have: “try small things that work at the margin, com-
plain a lot, but ultimately pay the bill.”170 The time is imminent, 
however, when decisions will have to be made to deny insured people 
coverage for services that are “genuinely beneficial or that patients 
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and their physicians [think] are beneficial.”171 That is, care will have 
to be rationed. Unlike other industrialized nations, America has no 
political process through which hard decisions on the funding of 
health treatments can be openly discussed,172 although we have ex-
perimented with such a process in a clumsy and experimental way.173 
We have relied in surprisingly large part on the talismanic signifi-
cance of statutory and contractual limits of coverage to that which is 
medically necessary, a term that lacks a cost-effectiveness component 
and, in any event, is sufficiently vague as to provide little practical 
guidance.174 Even very desirable goods must compete in some sense 
with others. As health care costs increase, so will conflicts. For some 
goods and services, this eventuality would merely lead to individual 
choices to refuse one good or service for another. In the case of health 
care, however, with its high and uncertain costs, the history of insur-
ance, and the “non-elective” nature of many consumption choices, 
some form of rationing is inevitable. 
 It is beyond the scope of this Article to predict what processes and 
with what resulting procedures Americans will construct their ra-
tioning system. Instead, I simply point out that any such system is 
likely to threaten care for people with genetic conditions. They face 
the threat likely to be faced by all with new or unusual health 
needs—the disfavored position in a game of musical chairs. In the 
game of musical chairs, players circle a ring of chairs and sit down 
when the music stops. One person cannot do so; others have already 
taken all available chairs, and the player left standing is “out,” due to 
her inability to gain a seat. If expensive and effective genetic treat-
ments emerge, they will be new and unfamiliar. If we come to accept 
limits on spending for medically necessary care, the risk is high that 
those who would benefit from unfamiliar, new and expensive treat-
ments will be left standing, as others, beneficiaries of older, more 
familiar treatments, occupy all of the chairs. In other words, the fail-
ure to thoughtfully plan for scarcity places at risk the more vulner-
able members of society—the poor, the disabled, and, in these cir-
cumstances, those who claim the benefit of expensive new treat-
ments. Forethought is therefore essential. 
 But how? Some taxonomy of “medically necessary” treatments 
must be derived in order to assort care between those types that will 
draw resources and those that will not. If history is any guide, there 
                                                                                                                    
 171. Aaron, supra note 168, at W86. 
 172. See id. at 85-86. 
 173. See Michael J. Astrue, Pseudoscience and the Law: The Case of the Oregon Medi-
cal Rationing Experiment, 9 ISSUES LAW & MED. 375 (1994); Note, The Oregon Health Care 
Proposal and the Americans With Disabilities Act, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1296 (1993). 
 174. See generally William M. Sage, Physicians As Advocates, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 1529 
(1999). 
2003]                          GENETIC DISCRIMINATION 397 
 
will be a tendency to favor established treatments over the new and 
treatments valued by the majority rather than those favored by the 
minority. Here, the egalitarian underpinnings of both disability law 
and genetic discrimination law must be called upon to make the case 
that it is illegitimate to make choices against coverage on the basis of 
the disability status of the expected recipient or on the basis of the 
genetic condition of the expected recipient. Disability-neutral and 
genetic-neutral methods of utilization management are called for. 
 One much-discussed approach to dealing with scarcity was re-
cently developed by Daniel Callahan.175 Callahan suggests a means 
to approach scarcity: 
[I]t is a fundamental mistake to generalize from the success of the 
past to assume like gains in the future. As George Washington 
once noted, “It would be . . . unreasonable to suppose that because 
a man has rolled a snowball till it acquired the size of a horse that 
he might do so till it was as large as a house.” Success there will 
surely be, and medical progress as well. But (a) the future is 
unlikely to hold great gains such as there were in the past,  that is, 
medial gains that have a decisive population health benefit; (b) fu-
ture advances will be proportionately far more expensive to find 
and to implement than those of the past; and (c) future advances 
will be considerably more likely to be ambiguous, perhaps even 
contradictory, in their human benefit.176 
Callahan’s solution is to substitute a vision of “sustainable medicine” 
for our current bias in favor of all beneficial medicine. It is a vision of 
medicine with limits, and it requires that we accept fundamental 
limits on our ability to rely on medicine to extend our lives indefi-
nitely. In some aspects, Callahan’s vision comports easily with the 
egalitarian vision of genetic discrimination.177 In others, it raises the 
specter of majoritarian bias that has historically threatened people 
with disabilities and now threatens people with genetic conditions. 
Callahan states as a goal of sustainable medicine “a decent level of 
physical and mental competence” and endorses “finite and steady-
state health goals and . . . limited aspirations for progress and tech-
nological innovation.”178 
 Callahan’s vision stands, in one sense, for what is inevitable: the 
creation of a methodology for reducing our thirst for ever more ex-
pensive and only marginally beneficial (if that) technological devel-
opments. It also presents a vision that can be construed as dangerous 
to those who are “different,” including people with disabilities and 
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people with genetic conditions. If “we” embrace a vision with limited 
aspirations, are we anticipating a game of musical chairs, in which 
either established treatments or treatments for the majority (or both) 
are appropriate, but new treatments or treatments for people with 
disabilities or genetic conditions are not? The push to rationing is 
coming, and the danger is clear. The struggle for disability rights 
shows that egalitarian notions are more easily embraced in the ab-
stract than when practical costs are apparent. At each step of the 
way, as disability and genetic discrimination in health insurance is 
encountered, egalitarian positions, rooted in the disability rights his-
tory, must be advanced. A norm of social pooling without regard for 
disability or genetic condition must be reinforced. The stakes are 
high now, but the future brings greater dangers as false hopes for 
endless medical progress are confronted. 
CONCLUSION 
 Genetic discrimination laws, adopting a notion of genetic equity in 
underwriting and coverage decisions, have broad support. That sup-
port is suspect, however, for two reasons. First, the laws were en-
acted at a time when genetic discrimination was a largely abstract 
notion, with genetic diagnostic and treatment methods in their in-
fancy. Second, they were adopted, in large part, during times of 
plenty, with relatively low health care cost inflation and high em-
ployment supported by a robust economy. The laws are varied and 
sometimes vague. The hard lessons learned from the dismemberment 
of the ADA by courts seizing on statutory ambiguities to limit indi-
vidual rights suggest that genetic statutes be clarified in advance of 
the time when genetics makes their protected vitally important, and 
that enforcement mechanisms be clearly set out.  
 Genetic discrimination laws are important both in their own right 
and as bellwethers for a movement of incremental reform of insur-
ance law. These reforms, of which genetic discrimination laws are a 
part, move a system, perversely making access to health coverage 
more readily available the less a person needs it, to one operating on 
a more egalitarian footing. These reforms will confront a tradition of 
health insurance law surprisingly hostile to social pooling mecha-
nisms, and care must be taken to avoid adverse selection and other 
transitional market faults.  
 The laws will face their sternest tests and will be most vital to 
protect access to health coverage as health care cost inflation surges. 
The inevitable real increases in health care costs will increasingly 
strain reasonable limits on society’s ability to pay. Rationing in some 
form will be inevitable. People with expensive genetic conditions or 
who will benefit from as-yet undiscovered genetic treatments will 
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face the same problem in a rationing regime as will others with new, 
unfamiliar, or disfavored health needs. They will face a game of mu-
sical chairs in which individuals with “traditional” illness and health 
care needs will believe they are entitled to sit when the music stops. 
The equitable principles underlying genetic discrimination laws must 
be well-entrenched before this game is played, in order to ensure that 
difficult choices will be made in an equitable manner. 
 
